Startup's employees, labeled ?joiners?, are an important resource for business success and their recruitment is a critical task. Compared to incumbents, startups have a harder time to recruit employees due to a lack of legitimacy and resources. Therefore, startups often use rhetorical strategies to convey the necessary information. However, earlier literature studying the processes attracting joiners to startups assumed perfect information between founders and joiners, overlooking the role information about the startup may have on the joiners' tendency to apply. We argue that startups can convey two types of messages. A message can be substantive, i.e., tightly related to the quality of the firm; or it can be ceremonial, i.e., loosely related to the quality of the firm. We further theorize that these messages can have different impacts on joiners with different taste for risk. We test our predictions using an online framed field experiment. We recruit 160 American respondents who are randomly assigned to a manipulated job ad following a 2x2 design. One treatment is a substantive message against a neutral message and another treatment is a ceremonial message against another neutral message. Our results partially support our hypotheses and show that substantive and ceremonial messages are different and have differential effects on different types of joiners. We further discuss implications for startups' recruitment strategies.
INTRODUCTION
The early human capital of entrepreneurial endeavors is a crucial factor for their success (Castanias and Helfat 1991, Williamson 2000) . However, startups have difficulties in hiring beyond the founders' personal network (Williamson et al. 2002) . During the recruitment process, startups face two main challenges compared to established firms. Because of the fundamental ambiguity surrounding startups, candidates have a harder time to comprehend and assess the quality of their prospective employers (Stinchcombe 1965, Aldrich and Fiol 1994) . Another challenge for startups are mismatches, whereas individuals join a startup as second-best option and leave soon for another job in an established firm or to start a company themselves (Sauermann 2017) . In order to gather initial resources, entrepreneurs rely on a vast array of rhetorical tools such as narratives (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001) , symbols (Zott and Huy 2007) , and labels to convey information strategically (Granqvist et al. 2013 ).
This view fundamentally departs from earlier studies on matching between founders and joiners, whose models assume perfect information between the parties (see, e.g., Honore and Ganco 2016) . Moreover, the literature on "joiners" analyzed their relationships with startups using either samples based on their preferences (Roach and Sauermann 2015) or realized matches (Chen 2013 , Ouimet and Zarutskie 2014 , Burton et al. 2017 . We therefore know little about the relationship between startup information and joiners' tendency to apply to a startup job.
In this paper, we address this gap by investigating which piece of information attracts joiners to a specific startup. To be more specific, our research question is the following: "can startup use different types of information to attract different types of joiners?" We answer our research question by bringing insights from resource acquisition and the literature about joiners.
We draw from the resource acquisition literature the relevance of information revealing to attract resources-financial in most cases (Stuart et al. 1999) . The literature about joiners allows us to test and verify whether this type of information is potentially effective for joiners and for which type of joiners in particular, dependent on candidate joiners' motives (Roach and Sauermann 2015) .
We draw from resource acquisition literature the basis for our classification of the information that startups reveal. Based on their relationship with the underlying quality of the venture, the piece of information can either be "substantive or "ceremonial" (Kirsch et al. 2009 ).
If this relationship is strong, such as messages about intellectual property (Hsu and Ziedonis 2013) , human capital (Chatterji 2009 ) or inter-organizational endorsement (Stuart et al. 1999) , we classify these messages as "substantive". In case of a weaker relationship between the information a startup conveys and the quality of the venture, such as messages about industry membership (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001, Granqvist et al. 2013 ) and credibility (Zott and Huy 2007) , we classify them as "ceremonial".
We hypothesize that the two different messages convey different meanings. Substantive messages serve as signals of quality (Spence 1973) and attract more and better qualified individuals, while ceremonial messages provide a complementary meaning that joiners enjoy together with the wage, thus attracting more individuals but at the margin of their quality. These two meanings echo the informative and complementary views on advertising (Bagwell 2007 ).
Moreover, we draw from literature about joiners to theorize differential effects of these two types of messages on different types of joiners in terms of their taste for risk Sauermann 2015, Sauermann 2017) . We theorize that substantive messages are more effective for risk-averse individuals; on the contrary, ceremonial messages attract less risk-averse individuals.
We test for heterogeneous effects of types of information using a framed online experiment. The scenario-based nature of the experiment allows us to collect motives and more behavioral information that would be harder to retrieve in a regular field experiment.
Respondents are 160 residents in the United States looking for new employment opportunities.
Each respondent evaluates a job ad where we randomize the type of information startups convey. We design a 2x2 between-subjects experiment where we manipulate a job ad with two treatments. One treatment group is the presence of a substantive message as inter-organizational endorsements, and the control group is the presence of a neutral sentence. The other treatment group is the presence of ceremonial messages as labeling strategy around the "disruptive" label, common in the startup world; and the control group is the presence of another neutral sentence.
Respondents express their interest in the job ad reporting the job attractiveness, and their likelihood to accept and the indifference salary to join that startup compared to a competing similar offer from an established firm.
In line with our expectations, we find that substantive messages increase the attractiveness of a startup. Contrary to our expectations, we find that substantive messages do not attract individuals with high human capital, and they are more effective on individuals with high risk propensity. As for ceremonial messages we find at least partial evidence in the direction of our hypotheses: ceremonial messages discourage individuals with high human capital and attract individuals with higher risk propensity.
Our study contributes to the extant literature on joiners in three ways. First, this study pioneers the relationship between characteristics of the startup and their communication to joiners. From a startup's strategy, it is important to understand which specific characteristics attract individuals to work for a startup. Second, to the best of our knowledge, the study represents an early experimental contribution to the above mentioned field. This experimental study relaxes assumptions about perfect information between joiners and founders of archival studies (Ganco and Honore 2016) . Finally, the study extends the literature about information and resource acquisition (Kirsch et al. 2009 ) looking at a different type of resource, labor.
The next section summarizes the reasoning behind the formulation of the hypotheses; the third section describes the design of the experiment; the fourth section presents the results; and the fifth section discusses the results and concludes.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Joiners and Startup Information
The role of human capital as source of competitive advantage is well-established in the management literature (Ryners and Barbers 1990, Castanias and Helfat 1991) . In an organization with limited resources such as a startup, the contribution of early human capital to its performance is larger. Despite such relevance, research has started to investigate joiners only recently (Sauermann 2017) .
One stream of literature focuses on the individuals. Joiners have systematically different motives, trait-like characteristics, than employees of established firms (Roach and Sauermann 2015) . Among the motives, risk propensity explains the differential performance of startup employees (Sauermann 2017) . Another stream of this relatively recent literature focuses on the workplace. Outimet and Zarutskie (2014) study the characteristics of employees joining firms that are both young and small. Burton et al. (2017) search for systematic differences within jobs' characteristics: compared to incumbents, young firms pay more, while small firms pay less. Kim (2017) addresses the issue further by surveying MIT graduates. He finds a wage premium for individuals working for VC-backed startups, and he illustrates how selection is the process explaining such premium.
Overall, these studies highlight the importance of understanding the mechanisms behind the attraction between startup and joiners (Chen 2013, Honore and Ganco 2016) . These studies often rely on the assumption about perfect information between founders and joiners, which becomes particular restrictive when attraction and recruitment of human capital happens beyond the social network of the founders (Williamson et al. 2002) . In this study, we release such assumption. This allows us to theorize that founders have discretion over selectively releasing information and there is room for agency in the attraction and recruitment of human capital.
Startup hiring and Information Asymmetry
The extant literature on human resource management has focused on recruitment practices in large and medium firms, thus not taking into account that young and small firms could have or require different practices (Williamson 2000 , Williamson et al. 2002 , Cardon and Stevens 2004 .
Startups are affected by the liability of newness (Stinchcombe 1965) , which implies that stakeholders have a hard time to assess their characteristics and quality. Startups employ rhetorical strategies to frame "the unknown in such a way it becomes believable" (Aldrich and Fiol 1994) such as narratives (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001) , category labels (Granqvist et al. 2013) , and symbolic action (Zott and Huy 2007) . Fundamentally, startups reveal information selectively, and such information has different degrees of cue validity Fiol 1994, Kirsch et al. 2009 ). We define cue validity as the relationship between the information and the underlying characteristics of the object information refers to (Rosch 1978) .
Information with a high degree of cue validity is substantive or "communicative" (Kirsch et al. 2009) . A message has high cue validity when the occurrence of a certain piece of information is highly predictive of the presence of high quality. The economics literature labels them as credible signals (Spence 1973) . Notable examples in resource acquisition literature are interorganizational endorsements (Stuart et al. 1999 ) and intellectual property (Hsu and Ziedonis 2013) . Such messages are costly and higher for low quality startups than for high quality startups.
Through endorsements, stakeholders can infer the quality of the startup because they assume that an established third party evaluated the benefits and costs of interacting with the startup, which is more likely to be positive for high than low quality startups (Stuart et al. 1999) . Another example of information with high cue validity due to monetary and non-monetary costs are patents. A patent costs $ 35,000 on average and it involves the opportunity cost of managing the application process. As a signal, a patent is particularly taxing for a startup (Hsu and Ziedonis 2013) . Thus, a startup that patents a technology of little value would incur higher relative costs than a startup that patents a technology of high value.
Information with a low degree of cue validity is "ceremonial" (Kirsch et al. 2009 ). Such information may have no relationship with the underlying quality of a venture, but it carries a symbolic value as it helps stakeholders to make sense of the nature of the venture and contributes to reducing the ambiguity surrounding it. Research has shown how firms in new industries can benefit from references to familiar understandings. Hargadon and Douglas (2001) illustrate the case of electric lighting, which got adopted also thanks to a design that anchored it to the more familiar gas lighting. Similarly, Etzion and Ferraro (2010) explain the success of sustainability reporting thanks to analogies with financial reporting. When it comes to new businesses, a certain dress code or familiar job titles increase the perception of the startup as legitimate (Zott and Huy 2007) . Organizational ecology documents the importance of isomorphism, i.e., the practice of mimicking the existing legitimate players in the industry (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) . Similarly, narratives about the venture and the use of category labels help stakeholders to locate the venture in the categorical space in the effort of achieving membership (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001, Santos and Eisenhardt 2009) . For example, claiming membership in a category helps stakeholders overcome the discount due to lack of legitimacy and achieve superior performance (Smith and Chae 2016) .
We argue that the issues of uncertainty over quality and lack of legitimacy that the liability of newness determines are common for both providers of financial and human capital. As a result, we draw on insights coming from resource acquisition, which studied the role of startups' and founders' information and investment, to analyze the effect of substantive and ceremonial messages on the decision to join a startup.
Substantive Messages
Founders can use information about the venture strategically to build effective narratives (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001) . A strategic balance between distinctiveness and membership is salient for startups for attracting prospective employees and may lead to competitive advantage (Deephouse 1999 , Williamson 2000 . We argue that substantive messages contribute to strategic balance by conveying distinctiveness (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001) .
Information about partnerships with established players reduces ambiguity over quality. A relationship with prominent actors increases the likelihood of the venture's and the job's survival (Baum and Oliver 1991) . Signaling quality helps to build reputation (Heil and Robertson 1991 , Rao 1994 , Rindova et al. 2005 . Reputation is considered the main driver to attract potential employees (Williamson et al. 2002) . At the margin, a more prominent venture is perceived as being of higher quality and more applicants will apply. Experts, exposed to substantive messages, tend to be quicker in the reception and the interpretation of information about the venture (Heil and Robertson 1991) . In the resource acquisition literature, prospective financers are more receptive of information about venture capital affiliation than other stakeholders, such as prospective employees (Vanacker and Forbes 2016) . At the margin, when ventures use substantive signals, it will attract a pool of applicants whose average quality of human capital is better.
Research about entrepreneurial human capital informs us that those attracted to small and young firm differ systematically from other employees of large firms or founders (Roach and Sauermann 2015) . Because of market frictions, sorting is imperfect leading to possible mismatches that might harm the venture's likelihood of success (Roach and Sauermann 2017) . Sauermann (2017) highlights willingness to bear risk as one of the main explanation of differential performance among startup employees.
Due to the pervasive incidence of failure during the first years (Gompers et al. 2010) , venture jobs are volatile. Evidence from a survey of PhD graduates shows that potential employees of high tech startups perceive the security of a startup job as significantly lower than for jobs in established firms (Roach and Sauermann 2010 
Ceremonial Messages
We further argue that ceremonial messages contribute to strategic balance by conveying membership (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001) . When a venture is just born, stakeholders have a hard time to make sense of it and thus the venture lacks cognitive legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol 1994) .
Firms engage in isomorphic behaviors (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and convey information to stakeholders in order to become meaningful (Petkova et al. 2013 ).
The goal of ceremonial messages differs from the goal of a substantive message: they allow stakeholders to locate the venture in the categorical space referring to the prototypical startup.
Examples of ceremonial messages are symbolic actions (Zott and Huy 2007) ; they have no intrinsic value, are often "cheap talk," and they are loosely related to the underlying quality of the startup. However, mimicking the formal organizational structures of established firms conveys professional organizing and contributes to gather more resources.
Startups can also convey cognitive legitimacy using words or phonemes like names (Smith and Chae 2016) or category labels (Pontikes 2012) . Smith and Chae (2016) suggest that the use of deliberate names can mitigate the discount due to cognitive legitimacy arising from atypical organizations. Granqvist et al. (2013) provide precise theory about the strategic use of category labels to shape and guide stakeholders' perceptions of the firm. Ventures without the capabilities implied by a certain category can still claim membership if this facilitates access to resources.
Ceremonial messages convey meaning to a startup and they may increase its cognitive legitimacy.
Potential employees may understand the business idea better and they can relate it to existing understandings. With a better meaning of the boundary of the firm and its associated category, more prospective employees are likely to apply.
Intuitively, more expert individuals tend to weigh ceremonial messages less. Mollick and Nanda (2015) compare the way professional and crowdfunding investors evaluate projects seeking resources on Kickstarter. They argue that the crowd is more sensitive to information that is less related to quality, such as videos, pictures, and informal language. Individuals with higher human capital endowments discount ceremonial messages because they comparatively more able to discern the relationship between the message and the underlying quality. Experts are a good example: they are more exposed to ceremonial messages and experienced the low correlation between those messages and the quality.
A possible mechanism is taken-for-grantedness, which makes awareness harder (Hsu and Grodal 2015) . People who have been exposed to ceremonial messages repeatedly through education or experience know more about the loose link with quality and disregard the message.
On the contrary, those who have been rarely exposed to ceremonial messages find value in their identity statements as they do not have experience about their value. Thus, a ceremonial message alone will increase the number of employees applying, but also decrease the average quality.
We also argue that ceremonial messages have different effect on individuals with different risk propensity. A ceremonial message conveys cognitive legitimacy as an early stage venture, but does not address the uncertainty about the venture's quality as likelihood to survive. A highgrowth venture is exposed to uncertainty: up to 78% of firms fail in their first two years (Gompers et al. 2010) . By conveying membership, a ceremonial message stresses the uncertain nature of the job: it may deliver disproportionate rewards in case of success, but it can also fail due to sheer bad luck (Schumpeter 1943) . Early stage ventures may tend to offer bonuses or equity, which are tightly coupled to performance. As a consequence, this larger use of variable pay contributes to the average lower salary early stage ventures offer (Burton et al. 2017 ). The promise of high rewards with high risk is more attractive to individuals that have higher risk propensity, and they are more likely to apply. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
EXPERIMENT
In order to study our research question, we propose an experimental methodology.
Experiments take place in a controlled environment where we expose subjects to one (or more) random treatment. The randomization in a controlled environment allows identifying the causal link between two constructs. The effect of information would be hard to study with a different methodology for two reasons. On the one hand, founders provide information about the startup and the business idea selectively. On the other hand, motives of joiners are hard to track and observe -in particular for those who observe but decided not to apply.
Our online framed field experiment (Harrison and List 2004) consists in proposing likely scenarios to representative individuals. An online field experiment is a compromise between feasibility (typical of lab experiments) and generalizability (of field experiments). A lab experiment would be attractive in terms of its feasibility. As a caveat, the student population would not be representative of the entire population of applicants for a job in a startup, who may include people like former founders or employees at an established firm. A field experiment would be more generalizable. However, deception would pose a particular threat for the substantive messages and it would be hard to find suitable partners both at the platform and startup level. In the next sections, we describe the design and the procedure of our experiment.
Design and Procedure
Each respondent evaluates one job offer from a startup that offers a "competitive" salary. We purposely do not report the location to avoid it may be imbued with symbolic value (Zott and Huy 2007) , for example a biotech startup located in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The job ad is for a business developer in the digital service business. This general job title is likely to attract many applicants, and the industry sounds quite gender neutral compared to e.g., videogames or fashion. Similarly, the position does not seem to require particularly high levels of education, and the requirements are broad enough to attract applicants with different education levels 1 . We anonymize the name of the employer to avoid that respondents may know them. This is not an uncommon practice in human resources, where agencies advertise jobs hiding the name of the employer. Each manipulated job offer consists of three sections. One about the startup, one about the job task, and the final section is about the environment and perks. We present each section in bullet points.
The design is between subjects with two treatments (substantive message and ceremonial message) and two different controls. We are aware that we use two neutral sentences as controls, rather than one only. We use two different neutral sentences to be sure that the differential effect is due to the nature of the information rather than the amount of information. Interviews with managers of online platforms for startup jobs revealed that they found correlation between length of the ad and the probability to apply. For this reason, we chose a control sentence with neutral value and same length. The treatments take place in the first section of the job ad about the startup. The substantive message (or its control sentence) appears as the last bullet point and consists of one sentence. The ceremonial message (or its control sentence) appears as the first bullet point and consist of one sentence.
2
For the substantive message, we use a sentence about interorganizational endorsement (Stuart et al. 1999 ): "We have perfected an alliance deal with Google and Facebook." For the control, we the following neutral sentence: "We are aiming to ally with the world's technology leaders." Alliances are a generally desirable feature of a company that does not relate to a "startup" identity 3 . For the ceremonial message, we use a sentence about labeling and narratives (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001, Granqvist et al. 2013 ): "We want to bring disruption in the digital service business." As a control, we use the following neutral sentence: "We are a digital consulting firm serving small and medium businesses." Disruption is very much present in the startup discourse, and it conveys membership and identity. In Figure 1 , we report an example of the job ad the respondents observe. In Table 1 , we report the four manipulations. *** Insert Figure 1 here *** *** Insert Table 1 here *** We pre-screen 200 people on Prolific, a job market platform specialized in scholarly studies (Peer et al. 2017 ). Our goal is to select a pool of people who are "at risk" of applying to a startup job. The screening question is: "Have you ever considered a career move as a (paid) employee in a startup?" Respondent are then introduced to the job ad as follows: "[Y]ou will be presented with the following information about a job opportunity in a startup: a description of the company, a description of the task, and additional information about the benefits. For the purpose of this study, the name of the venture is anonymous. Finally, you will be asked to note your application decision." The respondents read the job ad and answer questions about our outcome variables of interest, a manipulation check, their risk propensity, and a set of control variables. The task takes on average 5 minutes and we rewarded it with £ 50p, a nominal fee.
Variables Outcome Variables
In this study, we use three outcome variables that are overall measuring the individual's intention to join. The first two variables relate to the likelihood to apply for the job and to accept it vis-à-vis a comparable offer at an established firm. The last variable relates to a more granular wage premium required to accept the job at a startup. Ideally, the first two variables look at the extensive margin, while the third looks at the intensive margin.
Job Attractiveness. With this variable, we want to capture the effect of information on the propensity to apply. Respondents answer the item: "How attractive do you think the opportunity is?" They answer using a Likert scale from 1 to 7.
Probability of accepting. While the first variable asks about an overall opinion, this alternative outcome variable is based on our question: "Assume that you have the required skills and the startup is interested in hiring you. You also have an offer for a similar job in a larger established company with more than 500 employees. What is the probability of joining the startup?"
Respondents answer by reporting a probability from 0 to 100. Together with job attractiveness, we believe these two variables represent the extensive margin on the willingness to join.
Indifference salary. We measure the quality of the offer in a more granular way by asking the respondents what the salary would be that makes them indifferent between joining the startup and an alternative offer for a similar position in a large company for a yearly salary of $ 50,000.
This variable represents the intensive margin as represents the premium (or discount) joiners are willing to ask in order to choose a startup as employer. We adapt the question from Roach and Sauermann (2015) : "What is the salary the startup should offer you to make you indifferent and make you join? Please indicate the yearly salary before taxes in US Dollars." Respondents report the answer both in salary brackets and by quoting a precise expected salary. We compare these dual answers and use the comparison as an attention check. We screen out subjects with an inconsistent set of responses. The precise expected salary is used as outcome variable and enters the regression in logarithmic form.
Explanatory Variables
Substantive and Ceremonial Messages. decisions between a risky option that pays off with a 50% probability and a certain equivalent.
The 10 decisions are of increasing expected value, and the respondent is required to indicate their switching point from the certain equivalent to the lottery.
Control Variables
Albeit randomization in an experiment makes control variables unnecessary for unbiased estimation of the variables of interest, we collect and control for several variables to test random assignment and measure what else might affect the attractiveness of jobs for certain people. We control for the quality of human capital using measures of education attainment in terms of type of degree (high school, bachelor, master, and PhD) and dropout status. We control for gender, as females are usually less likely to be joiners Wang 2017, Rocha and Van Praag 2017) and age since younger people are more likely to work for startups (Outimet and Zarutskie 2014) . Finally, we also include as controls the number of the location of respondents' place of residence (zipcode) and the minutes the respondents took to fill the survey, to approximate for the level of attention of the participants. We cluster standard errors at the two-digit zipcode level, which is more granular than the state level to take into account unobservable heterogeneity across regions.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
We posted a call for 200 respondents living in the United States who reported to have recently considered joining a startup as a future career move. We screen out a total of 41 respondents who provided inconsistent answers and failed the attention test or who completed the survey in less than 2 minutes or more than 15 minutes. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics pertaining to the remaining 159 subjects.
The job prospect is considered on average relatively attractive, supporting the idea that we surveyed individuals who expressed a clear interest in joining a startup as a next career step.
Interestingly, when choosing between a similar offer from an established company and our startup, only 47% of the respondents would accept the offer from the startup. This is reflected by the indifference salary: an offer from a startup requires an extra salary of on average 24% to compete with a $ 50,000 offer from an established firm.
Respondents are on average 31 years old, and 60% of them are male. Both the relatively young age and the high percentage of men is consistent with the employee population in startups studied by Ouimet and Zarutskie (2014) for the United States, and Burton et al. (2017) studying employees in startups in Denmark. For what concerns education, the vast majority of respondents, 84%, have at least some college education. More specifically, 65% have college education, 18% have master education, and 3% have doctoral education. Among respondents, 13% dropped out from their education. Finally, we look at the risk propensity. Based on (the inverse of) the Holt and Laury (2005) methodology to elicit risk aversion, respondents are on average risk averse, scoring 3.84 out of 10 on the index of risk propensity. At a first glance, the result may be surprising. There are two explanations to the result. First, the relationship between risk propensity and joining a startup is lower than the relationship between risk propensity and founding a startup (Roach and Sauermann 2015) . Second, we elicited the risk propensity of the individuals rather than asking their subjective self-assessments, which can correlate more to their perceived identity. *** INSERT TABLE 2 HERE *** The effect of substantive and ceremonial messages on becoming a joiner Table 3 shows the results of the experiment. We test three models, each using a different outcome variable: job attractiveness (job) in Model 1; probability to accept the offer (prob) in We observe that a substantive message has a positive effect on the perception of the job offer from the startup. The coefficients of the substantive message for the job attractiveness are positive and significant at the 5% level in Model 1. Compared to a baseline score of 3.65, a substantive message makes respondents perceive the job between 16% and 18% more attractive.
The effect of the substantive message is possibly stronger when respondents compare the offer with an alternative job from an established company. The coefficients are positive and significant at the 10% level in Model 2. Compared to a baseline of 37%, a substantive message proportionally increases the probability of joining a startup compared to a similar offer from an established company between 24% and 26%. Finally, in Model 3 we look at the effect of the substantive message on the indifference salary. In this specification, a negative coefficient means that a respondent is willing to accept a lower salary compared to an alternative job offer from an established firm. In the specification without the controls, the coefficient is negative but insignificant. When controlling for age, gender, and education, the coefficient is marginally insignificant. Compared to the indifference salary of respondents who visualized a job ad with neither ceremonial nor substantive messages, the indifference salary of respondents who visualize a substantive message only, is 22%-26% lower, thus suggesting more willingness to join.
The results provide overall support Hypothesis 1: a substantive message makes people more inclined to apply and join the startup.
For what concerns the ceremonial message, we find no evidence of its effectiveness across the three models. The presence of a ceremonial message is negative and not significant both for job attractiveness and the probability to accept. The size of the standard errors ranging from 4 to 6 times the size of the coefficients seems to suggest that it may not only be a problem of statistical power. The effect of a ceremonial message on the indifference salary is also insignificant, albeit with a negative coefficient. Overall, we find no support for Hypothesis 4. A ceremonial message does not make respondents more inclined to apply and join a startup.
A potential explanation may be that respondents do not appreciate the value of a ceremonial message without the co-occurrence of a stronger signal of quality. If this was a potential explanation, then the co-occurrence with a substantive message would have a positive effect, meaning that their interaction is positive. When we look at the condition of co-occurrence of ceremonial and substantive messages, we find, if anything, the opposite result. The interaction between substantive and ceremonial messages is negative, in the sense that the presence of a ceremonial message undermines the credibility of the substantive message. *** INSERT TABLE 3 HERE *** To test Hypotheses 2 and 5, we look at the different impact of substantive and ceremonial messages on individuals with different levels of human capital. We operationalize individuals with high human capital as those with postgraduate education (master or doctorate) and obtain two subsamples: we categorize 31 participants, about 20% of the sample, as with high human capital. We reran the analysis of Table 3 with controls (excluding education dummies) and compared the coefficients for the two messages in the two subsamples-which we label High and Low Human Capital.
For what concerns substantive messages, we find no support for Hypothesis 2. The coefficient for substantive messages among individuals with high human capital is positive and larger than the coefficient for individuals with low human capital, but the difference is not statistically significant. On the contrary, for the indifference salary, a substantive message has a positive although not significant coefficient, suggesting that individuals with high human capital would require a larger salary to be indifferent vis-à-vis a comparable offer from an established firm. On the contrary, individuals with low human capital are attracted by the substantive message: they would require a lower indifference salary when a substantive message is present.
Overall, we found no support-only some directional evidence on the extensive margin-for
For what concerns ceremonial messages, we find only limited support to Hypothesis 5.
On the extensive margin, the coefficients for job attractiveness and probability are positive and larger for individuals with high human capital than for individuals with low human capital. This result is per se directionally against Hypothesis 5. Moreover, all the coefficients are not significant and their difference is neither. On the intensive margin, the indifference salary, we find some evidence in support of Hypothesis 5. For individuals with high human capital, the coefficient for the ceremonial message is positive and significant. This suggests that a ceremonial message demands higher indifference salary for individuals with higher human capital to join. On the contrary, a ceremonial message has a negative and significant coefficient for individuals with low human capital. The difference in coefficient is statistically significant at 5% level (p-value=0.011).
With a ceremonial message, more people with low human capital would accept a lower salary to prefer a startup job and less people with high human capital would accept a lower salary to prefer a startup job. Overall, we find support to Hypothesis 5, limited to the indifference salary.
When substantive and ceremonial messages co-occur the results are somehow mixed. On the extensive margin, the coefficient is positive larger for individual with high human capital, but it is significant only for the probability to access. These results suggest that substantive message is prevailing. For the indifference salary, the coefficients are similar to those for the ceremonial message. However, the difference is not statistically significant. All in all, we found no support for Hypothesis 2, and limited support for Hypothesis 5. *** INSERT TABLE 4 HERE *** In Table 5 , we test Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 6, i.e., the interactions between substantive and ceremonial messages and risk propensity. Hypothesis 3 predicted that substantive messages are more effective on people with low risk propensity, while the opposite is true for Hypothesis 6: ceremonial messages are more effective on people with high risk propensity. We divide the sample between those whose risk propensity is above or below the median value. For what concerns the substantive message, the results seem in the opposite direction. Throughout the three models, the substantive message seems to be positively correlated to the propensity to join both on the extensive and intensive margins when the individuals have higher risk propensity. The differential effect is significant in Models 2 and 3, the probability of joining and the indifference salary. We found evidence in the opposite direction with respect to Hypothesis 3.
For what concerns the ceremonial message, the results seem to go in the direction we hypothesized. For Model 1, the coefficients have opposite sign but they are not significant. However, their difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. For Models 2 and 3, the effect of the ceremonial message is large and significant when individuals have higher risk propensity, while it is negative and not significant when individuals have lower risk propensity. The difference is statistically significant at least at the 5% level.
Overall, we found no support for Hypothesis 3 and opposite results, and support for Hypothesis 6. Substantive and ceremonial messages go in the same direction, making joining a startup more attractive to risk-loving individuals. Interestingly, while the interaction between substantive and ceremonial messages nullified the effect of substantive messages, this is not the case with risk propensity.
As a robustness test, we reran the analysis on the subsample without the ceremonial message. The rationale behind this robustness is the possibility to interpret the neutral sentence used as control to the substantive message as a ceremonial message. If that was true, there could be some biases due to interaction between two ceremonial messages that can distort the results.
The results of the robustness analysis are overall consistent. We report these additional results in tables A1 to A3 of the Appendix. *** INSERT TABLE 5 HERE *** Table 6 summarizes the Hypotheses and the support resulting from our analysis. While we find at support for the hypothesized relationships between the substantive message and the tendency to join a startup, we find no support for the hypothesized relationships between the ceremonial message and the tendency to join a startup. Interestingly, we find evidence in the opposite direction of the hypotheses. Ceremonial messages seemed to have a negative insignificant effect on the tendency to join or the amount required to join. The interaction between these two types of messages seems to suggest that the substantive message loses its efficacy when it co-occurs with a ceremonial message.
For substantive messages, we find no support and evidence in the opposite direction. For ceremonial messages, we find only partial support to our Hypotheses 5 and support for Hypothesis 6. For the intensive margin, ceremonial messages discourage individuals with high human capital to accept the job offer; a ceremonial message has an opposite significant effect for individuals with low human capital, consistent with our theorizing. As for Hypothesis 6, we found that individuals with higher levels of risk propensity tend to be attracted to a startup job, while a ceremonial message has little effect on individuals with low risk propensity.
Interestingly, the interaction between substantive and ceremonial messages seems to cancel out in the main effects: the ceremonial message seems to "dilute" the effect of the substantive message. We found a similar tendency in the heterogeneous treatment effects. *** INSERT TABLE 6 HERE ***
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our study originates from the desire to understand how joiners react to different types of information a startup conveys. Early employees can be crucial for startup success (Castanias and Helfat 1991) and a new venture has a harder time to recruit talent than an established firm because of the liability of newness (Stinchcombe 1965) . Earlier studies on the topic of early human capital looked mostly at realized labor market transactions and assumed perfect information between founders and joiners. As a consequence, we know little about the role of strategic revealing of startup information. Drawing from the resource acquisition literature (Kirsch et al. 2009 ), we have argued that the startup has some agency in attracting early human capital by conveying messages with high cue validity, i.e. substantive messages, or messages with lower cue validity but symbolic power, i.e., ceremonial messages.
We argued that substantive messages can be beneficial to the startup recruitment process as they can be a signal of quality (Stuart et al., 1999) , which enhances reputation (Rindova et al., 2005) and produce distinctiveness (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001) . We posited that individuals endowed with better human capital are attracted by substantive messages and they attract potential joiners differently. Individuals with higher levels of risk aversion can be attracted more by these types of messages.
We also argued that ceremonial messages can be beneficial to the startup recruitment process in a different way, that is by conveying a symbolic meaning (Zott and Huy, 2007) , enhancing legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994) and membership (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001 ).
We further hypothesized that individuals with lower degrees of human capital are attracted by ceremonial messages, but that individuals with higher degrees of risk tolerance were more sensitive to ceremonial messages.
We tested our proposed hypotheses using an online experiment with 160 subjects interested in a startup career in the United States who were randomly assigned to a manipulated advertisement for a generic business developer job in a startup. Each subject expressed their evaluation of the job attractiveness, their probability of joining if they were offered the advertised position, and their indifference salary with respect to a competing offer from an established company.
Our results provide general support for the hypotheses related to the main effect of the substantive message, and provide evidence in the opposite direction to the heterogeneous effects of substantive messages for both human capital and risk propensity. We also find that the main effect of ceremonial messages is close to zero, but it has differential effects at least partially in the hypothesized directions. Ceremonial messages are effective for individuals with lower human capital but discourage individuals with high human capital. As for risk propensity, ceremonial messages attract individuals with higher risk propensity. In the next paragraphs we discuss some of the findings and speculate about alternative explanations.
First, the finding that individuals with higher human capital are not sensitive to substantive message is somewhat surprising. One possible explanation can relate to the quality of the substantive message we conveyed. Individuals with higher human capital can still disregard the substantive message as they know that, despite the signaling value, working with industry leaders is more of a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for success 5 . Second, we found that substantive messages are more effective among individuals with high risk propensity. A potential explanation may lie in what joiners expect from quality. It may be that quality does not only relate to the likelihood of survival, but it may also convey growth potential-especially among early stage ventures. Therefore, higher potential for growth prospects a riskier venture promising higher (uncertain) wages in the future, which are more palatable to risk-loving joiners.
This study makes a contribution to the entrepreneurship literature on human capital of startups in three ways. First, this study pioneers the relationship between characteristics of the startup and their communication to joiners. Earlier studies focused on the nature of the joiners (Ouimet and Zarutskie 2014 , Roach and Sauermann 2015 , Sauermann 2017 , their relationship with the employers (Ganco and Honore 2016), and their labor market outcomes (Burton et al. 2017) . Second, to the best of our knowledge, the study represents an early experimental contribution to the field of literature about joiners. An experimental study is important to relax assumptions about perfect information between joiners and founders (Ganco and Honore 2016).
This study complements earlier studies that found evidence of positive sorting between workers and founders in terms of ability. We do not find evidence of sorting based on human capital, but we find that both substantive and ceremonial messages increase the pool of individuals with higher risk propensity. It may be that the quality of the venture was too uncertain even with the additional information to find sorting based on quality of human capital (we provided no information about the founder, there may be sorting based on the quality of the founder). However, we provided sorting based on the uncertainty nature of the startup: substantive and ceremonial messages sort individuals with higher risk preference into the startup.
This may be desirable for founders of early stage ventures because risk aversion has been found to be hindering performance of innovative tasks (Sauermann 2017 ).
Finally, the study borrows concepts about management of information to deal with the uncertainty from resource acquisition literature (Kirsch et al., 2009 ) and extends it to a different type of resource, labor. Entrepreneurs need to manage information strategically not only to collect financial resources (Stuart et al. 1999 ), but also to be able to attract human capital at the best economic conditions. It seems that conveying certain type of information at the early stage changes the level of expected salary they would need to prefer a startup job vis-à-vis a job in an established firm.
Our study has important boundary conditions. First of all, the study is limited by design to later stage joiners. These joiners are usually outside the founders' network (Williamson et al. 2002) . It could be that for very early joiners, the information about the startup cannot be disentangled from the founder's. In that case, private information about the founder would overwhelm the information provided by ceremonial and communicative messages. In addition, startups in a later stage are formalizing their processes and they may attract different types of joiners. Early stage joiners may be more attracted by learning opportunities to found a startup themselves, while later stage joiners may appreciate formalization and the higher chances of survival, leading to a more secure position in the startup (Sirigiri 2017) . Future research can help clarifying this distinction between early and later stage joiners.
As a second boundary condition, the job in the ad is of managerial nature. We chose a job with a managerial nature to alleviate the concern that individuals may not be qualified for the position. A managerial job is attractive for a larger pool of joiners due to its general nature than a more technical position. However, individuals with technical backgrounds can respond to different sources of information (Eesley et al. 2014) . For example, they can be more interested in the task rather than the firm and be insensitive to any information about the startup. The focus of their attention can shift towards the details of the tasks required. Future research should distinguish between managerial and technical joiners and establish the more effective type of message that can attract them to a startup job.
The third boundary condition is related to the location of the information. In the job ad, the manipulations take place in the description about the startup. Individuals with higher levels of human capital may look at different types of information in different sections of a job ad-for example, they may want to know more about the founder or about the task they are required to perform.
Finally, we are measuring stated intentions and not actual ones. We know that the link may be weak, especially when the experimental task does not have an incentive. Future research should build on these initial results to design a proper field experiments that measures actual intentions in a real life setting.
Despite its preliminary stage, this study provides some counterintuitive insights that startups and online recruitment services can keep in mind about different types of messages that can elicit different types of reactions. We hope that this paper can open the field to a more thorough analysis of the information for effective recruitment of human capital for startups. 
